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Million: Million: Community Property

COMMUNITY PROPERTY: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS
AND STUDENTS OF FORTY STATESt
Eiv= M.

MIhuoN*

I.
This article is written for lawyers and law students in non-community property states, on the theory that what they need is not an
exhaustive knowledge of the various community property laws, nor a
detailed knowledge of such laws in a single state, but a notion of the
underlying theory and effect of community property jurisdictions, the
types of problems and distinctions that may be important, and a means of
remembering "which of those western states" have adopted community
property.
"Community Property" connotes a Civil Law institution of joint
ownership between husband and wife and, in particular, a varyingly
similar institution1 presently in force in eight 2 of the forty-eight United
tTbis article in somewhat shorter form will appear in 2 WASH & NinEs, CASES

ON PROPRTY (2d ed., Published by Bobbs-Merrill).

*Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; author of Sawyer v.
Admv. of Injun Joe, 16 Mo. L. REV. 27 (1951); Political Crime, 5 Mo. L. REv. 164

(1940).
1. General texts on community property includes: DE FuNIax, PixciPLES OF
Co wuNr
PROPERTY (1943), 2 vols. (hereinafter called DE FUTAK) (and see vol. 2
for bibliography of books and articles); McKAY, ComnumTY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1925);
MoYNIHAN, COMUrNITY PROPERTY (in 2 AamrcAn LAW OF PRoPERTY, 199-221) (1952)
[hereinafter called MoYxn-AN
(2 A.L.P.) ].
Local texts include: California: Community Property (1953), in 10 CALIF. JmusPRUDENCE (2d series). Idaho: JACOB, THE LAW OF CozMruXTY PROPERTY IN IDAHO
(2d ed. 1943) (hereinafter called JACOB): Louisiana: DAGGETT, THE ConnmUTY PROPERTY SYSTESi OF LoUIsiANA (1945) ( hereinafter called DAGGETT). New Mexico: [A
text may be in prospect. See articles by Prof. Clark on New Mexico community property: 24 RocKY MT. L. REv. 273 (1925); 25 So. CAizF. L. Rv. 149 (1952); 26 TuLANE L.
REV. 324 (1952).] Texas: SPEER, MAP=AL RIGHTS IN TEXAS (3rd ed. 1929); Hum, THE
COLrniUNTY PROPERTY LAW OF TExAS (1951) [reprinted from 13 TEX. Civ. STAT. pp.
7-46 (Vernon, 1951) ].
Excellent brief surveys of the system appear in: Comment, The Community
Property System, 27 BOSTON U.L. REV. 442-459 (1947); Sebree, Outline of Community
Property, 6 N.Y.UL. Rv.32-51 (1928) (historical); De Funiak, A Review in Brief
of Principles of Community Property, 32 KY. L. J. 63-74 (1943); Marital Property, 10
ENc. Soc. Sci. 116-122 (comparison with common law and European systems); 3
VERNIER, ABRcIAN FAMILY LAws § 178 (1935). See also Steere, An Introduction to the
Law of Community Property, 23 IND. L. J. 34 (1947) and a capsule account in 2
TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 237-246 (3d ed. 1939).
No evaluation is made of the inevitable volumes published in each of the "new"
adopting states to explain the provisions of its (short-lived) community property
statute. In this category, see EAGiN, Co
m
PROPERTY LAw IN OKLAHoMA (1940)
(the elective statute); WMAHS, CoM-UNITY PROPERTY PoBL mAs IN NEBRAsKA,

(201)
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States. Although often treated as a subdivision of the law of Persons or
Domestic Relations (see e.g., the title Husband and Wife in American
Digest, Corpus Juris Secundum, A.L.R. Digest, The Index to Legal
Periodocals,etc.) 3 or recognized as an independent legal field (see card
catalog listings under Community Property and the same title in American Jurisprudence,CaliforniaJurisprudence,etc.), community property
is essentially a kind of concurrent ownership of real and personal property by husband and wife. It could even be called tenancy in community,
and in any case is to be distinguished from joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, tenancy by entireties, and partnership.
To oversimplify, one might say that under community property
statutes:
(1) Everything acquired by either spouse before marriage shall
remain separate property.

(2) All income and earnings of either spouse during the marriage
shall belong to both as community property.
(3) Property acquired gratuitously by one spouse from a third
pp.79 (1947); MICHIGAN Comnwu=T PaoPR TY AcT wIT EXPLANATION, pp. 31 (National
Bank of Detroit, 1947); LowRy & ROBERT, THE OaEGoN COIIMUNrTY PRoPERTY LAW
(Oregon State Bar, 1947); CLAr, THE P=NsYLVANIA CoBnmT= PROPERTY LAW,
pp. 23 (1947) Of greater importance are the articles and notes written in legal
periodicals of such adopting states. Legal periodical material on the "new" laws
dealt principally with their tax effects or with the effect or repeal. For two exceptions
see Garrett, Conveyances Under the Community Property Law, 18 OIL. B. A. J. 1292
(1947); Latta and Cemmill, Observations on Some Pennsylvania Community Property Problems, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 20, 118 (two parts) (1947). For similar material
on the operation of the Oregon statute, see Ganong, Community Property and Presumptions, 28 ORE. L. Rrv. 157 (1949); Coulter, Extent of Powers of Management and
Control of Community Property,28 ORE. L. REv. 320 (1949); Coulter, Limitation on the
Power of the Community Manager to Make Gifts from the Community Property, 28
ORE. L. REv. 210 (1949); and Notes: 28 ORE. L. REv. 58, 61, 70, 72 (1948).
2. Washington, Idaho, Nevada, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and
Louisiana. This list might profitably be learned. Mnemonic aid: Oregon is not a
community property state. If Oregon were gone (i.e. beneath the waters of the
Pacific), a line drawn from Puget Sound southerly through the then coastal and
border states to the Mississippi River mouth, would pass exclusively through the eight
community property states.
Concerning the derivation of these community property statutes, see Kirkwood,
Historical Background and Objectives of Community Property in the Pacific Coast
States, 1 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1936), reprinted in SELEcTED EssAYs ON FAmLY LAw 514
(1950).
3. Cf. TEX. Civ. STAT. vol. 13, tit. Husband and Wife, ch. 3 "Rights of Married
Women" (Vernon, 1951) (containing the community property sections).
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person (whether by. gift, by will or by intestacy) is separate property,
4
even though acquired during the marriage.
(4) In a few community property states 5 the income derived during
the marriage but from separate property (e.g., from interest on capital,
or as rent) is itself community property, but the greater number of community property jurisdictions treat it as separate property. The proceeds
from the sale (although during marriage) of separate property retain
separate property status. Where such proceeds represent a profit over
the value of the res at the time acquired, a further inquiry must be made.
Ideally, the portion of the profit resulting from the labor or enterprise
of a spouse during marriage should be community property; the portion
representing enhancement of value due to extrinsic factors (neighborhood growth, increased demand, or inflation) should a fortiori be separate
property in states so treating the rent from separate property, and might
be separate property even in other community property states.6

Ii.
Lawyers are understandably prone to think of the "community
property system" as constituting a unit, operating exactly alike in the
eight states. In reality, however, the system includes an infinite variety
of problems, not all solved the same way in each community property
state. Typical of such problems are the following:
4. The Civil Law makes a distinction between "pure donations" and "remuneratory gifts". DE FumAK § 70. Again, what if the gift, devise, bequest or (where the
spouses were parents of the intestate) inheritance was to both spouses? That it is
community property, see DE FuNiAK § 69; that it is separate property except in
Louisiana, see McKAY, Coanmxrr PROPERTY §§ 200, 260 (2d ed. 1925); 3 VERNI,
A .mmc=xF
Iy LAWS § 178 (1931); that it is separate even in Louisiana if made to
each spouse "particularly" rather than to the spouses jointly, See id. at p. 210.
If the gift were from one spouse to the other, would the result be affected by
whether the attempted gift was made from community property or the donor's

separate property? See DE FurNAx §§ 140-144.
5. Idaho (except as to such of wife's separate property as came by an instrument specifying othervise), Louisiana (except as to paraphernal property administered by the wife and, since 1944, only if in addition a recorded instrument so
reserved the power to manage), and Texas. Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S.W. 2d
152, 73 A.L.R. 1512 (1931) voided a contrary statute as violative of the definition of
separate property in the Texas Constitution. Conversely, George v. Ransom, 15 Cal.
322, 76 Am. Dec. 490 (1860) invalidated, as violative of the California constitutional
definition of separate property, an 1850 statute which declared that the rents and
profits of separate property of either spouse should be community. See CALIF. CIV.
CODE §§ 162, 163 (Deering 1949); CAIF. CoNsT. AoxN. Art. XX, § 8 (Mason, 1953).
6. DE FUNIAK § 73; JACOB, 47-49; Kultgen, Profits From Sale of Separate Property in Texas: Community or Separate? 28 TEx. L. REv. 576 (1950).
Where money is derived from sale of timber, or leasing of mineral rights, in real
property held as separate property, should such money be treated as income or as
proceeds of a (pro tanto) sale? May the two be treated differently?
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(a) Necessity of marriage. The rule hereon is analogous to that
applicable to dower. Generally, no community property arises under a
null marriage. A few community property states permit common law
marriage; 7 the majority do not, 8 but in both groups of states the primary
inquiry is whether the marriage was valid where it occurred.0 If a
voidable marriage is not avoided, a community exists; where the voidable
marriage is annulled, no community property arises thereafter but existing community interests should not be divested.' 0 A further qualification
exists, moreover, under the doctrine of putative marriage in Louisiana,"1
and Texas,12 and to a lesser extent in a few other states by analogy or
14
estoppel's or under an express or implied joint venture.
7. Idaho, Nevada and Texas. 1 VENIER, Aw. FAw. LAWS § 26; Huff v. Huff, 20
Idaho 450, 118 Pac. 1080 (1911); State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802 (1896);
Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P. 2d 355, 359 (1950); and see Cornell v.
Mabe, 206 F. 2d 514, 517 (5th Cir. 1953) (citing Texas cases). Common law marriages
may not be contracted in Oregon: Huard v. McTreigh, 113 Ore. 279, 232 Pac. 658
(1952); Note, 4 ORE. L. REv. 308 (1925). Nor, since 1923, in Nebraska. Annotations, 60
A.L.R. 541 (1929); 94 A.L.R. 1000 (1935); Harrison v. Cargill Comm. Co., 126 Neb. 185,
252 N.W. 899 (1934). For the prohibitory Nebraska statute, see 3 NsB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-104 (1943).
8. Arizona, California, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Washington. 1 VERNIER,
AsmICa FAnILy LAws § 26 (1931); In re Gabaldon's Estate, 38 N.M. 392, 34 P. 2d
672, 94 A.L.R. 980 (1934) (two judges dissenting), noted in 35 COL. L. REy. 947 1935); 5
ARiz. CODE A'N. § 63-111. For the earlier Arizona view, see United States v. Tenney,
2 Ariz. 127, 11 Pac. 472 (1885).
9. Re Gallagher's Estate, 35 Wash. 2d 512, 213 P. 2d 621 (1950) (recognizing
Michigan common law marriage); State v. Brem, 51 N. M. 63, 178 P. 2d 582 (1947)
(Texas marriage).
10. Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 Pac. 441, 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 844 (1911). Cf.
DE FuwiAx, § 226.

11. McCaffrey v. Benson, 40 La. Ann. 10, 3 So. 393 (1888).
12. Texas originally recognized the property effects of putative marriage but
after adopting in 1840 the English common law as a rule of decision, properly recognized the doctrine only as to relationships antedating 1840. Note, 1 TEx. L. REv. 469
(1923); Ft. Worth & R.G. Ry. v. Robertson, 103 Tex. 504, 131 S. W. 400 (1910)
[memorandum, adopting the dissenting opinion from intermediate court, 121 S.W. 202
(Tex. Civ. App. 1909) ]. In Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm. App.
1923), Texas reverted to the putative marriage doctrine. New Mexico has been cited
as possibly recognizing putative marriage. McKAY, CoDnMrMTY PRoPRTY 191 (1st ed.
1925); Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 Pac. 533 (1920).
13. In California, Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 Pac. 441, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 844
(1911), although insisting that lawful marriage was indispensable to technical community property, applied the concept by analogy to give the woman half of the property acquired by the parties' joint efforts before their voidable marriage was annulled.
Later, however the same court expressly applied the putative marriage doctrine to
allow a full community share to a bona fide woman whose "marriage" was absolutely
void because of her own undissolved prior marriage. Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal.
335, 191 Pac. 533, 11 A. L. R. 1386 (1920), noted approvingly, 9 CAIF. L. REv. 68 (1920),
Accord: Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P. 2d 761 (1943).
Where putative marriage exists, or is applied by analogy, what distribution would
be made of property derived from the earnings of a married man who fraudulently
"married" two additional unsuspecting women, then died survived by ali three
"wives"? Cf. Note, 9 CAIF. L. Rav. 243 (1921); Moyxns x (2 A.L.P.) § 7.7, nn. 10, 11.
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(b) Termination of community. Death or absolute divorce ends the
community, preventing later acquisitions from becoming community
property, but permitting a division of the existing community holdings
according to the applicable statute."
(c) Workman's Compensation and Tort Claims. If one spouse loses
a limb and recovers therefor under Workmen's Compensation or by
judgment against a tort-feasor, is such recovery community or separate?1 6 What of a recovery, during marriage, for defamation of the
17
plaintiff occurring before the marriage?
14. Washington, although insisting that it is not community property, has also
allowed the innocent woman a full half of gains arising from the parties' combined
efforts during the void marriage. Knoll. v. Knoll, 104 Wash. 110, 176 Pac. 22, 11 A.L.R.
1391 (1918). For the rule where the parties always knew they were not lawfully
married, see Note, 20 CAvF. L. REV. 453 (1932). Cf. Hynes v. Hynes, 28 Wash. 2d 660,
184 P. 2d 68 (1947); Poole v. Scbrichte, 39 Wash. 2d 558, 236 P. 2d 1044 (1951).
15. The effect (on the husband's managerial powers, the status of later acquisitions, and the right to a present division of community property) of limited divorce,
judicial separation, an interlocutory decree not becoming final before one spouse died,
abandonment (desertion) by one spouse of the other, and separation by mutual consent need not be considered here. DE Fuwims §§ 224-227; Note, 25 WAsH. L. Rv. 284
(1950). If the spouses have separated, the "earnings and accumulations" of the wife
and her minor children living with her, are often expressly declared by statute to be
her separate property. DAGGETT, p. 10; DE FuNiAx §§ 57, 68 n. 4; Lorang v. Hays, 69
Idaho 440, 209 P. 2d 733 (1949) (recovery for false arrest and false imprisonment, the
action accruing while plaintiff lived separately and apart from her husband, was her
separate property).

16. Traditionally, the recovery was community property. DE FUNIAX § 82;
Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 CA. 2d 315, 202 P. 2d 73 (1949); 37 CAtrr. L. REv. 318 (1949);
22 So. CAvte. L. Rnv. 455 (1949); 113 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Tex. 1953). Dissatisfaction with
this result prompted a Texas statute (later declared unconstitutional) to provide that
compensation for personal injuries sustained by the wife should be her separate property. Arnold v. Leonard 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); but cf. Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886). Louisiana enacted a parallel statute. All six of the recent
tax-inspired community property statutes specified that compensation received for
personal injuries sustained by either spouse should be separate property of that
spouse. Money damages recovered by the father from a third person bcause of the
death or injury of the child is held to be community property, as are the minor
child's wages. Both results are criticized in 1 DE Fuxisx §§ 68.1, 85. And see Carver
v. Ferguson, 254 P. 2d 44 (Cal. App. 1953), that a wife may recover against her
husband for injuries received while riding in his car before their marriage, and such
recovery is her separate property. (This case was later dismissed June 4, 1953.)
Considerable confusion arose as to whether proceeds of life insurance policies
were community property, and the importance to be attached to the fact that the
policy was taken out before marriage or that all or some of the premiums were from
community funds. Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance, 17
TEx. L. REv. 121 (1939), 18 Id. 121 (1940); Annotation, 168 A.L.R. 342. Cf. Wissner v.
Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950), rehearingdenied, 339 U.S. 926 (1950) (National Service
Life Insurance); In re Foy's Estate, 109 CalA. 2d 329, 240 P. 2d 685 (1952) (premiums
paid by employer); Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F. 2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953);
Note, 28 WAsH. L. REv. 236 (1953); Note, 25 So. CA-aF. L. REv. 466 (1952). Some statutes
sought only to protect the insurance company that paid the named beneficiary in good
faith, leaving unchanged the rights of the spouses inter se. IDAHo CODE § 41-1402 (1948).
17. See DE Fu ,Ax § 82 for a suggestion that recoveries for defamation of a
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(d) Title by Adverse Possession. If, when marrying, the man had
been in adverse possession for less than the statutory period, and thereafter completed that period without interruption, would the title acquired
by adverse possession be separate or community property?' 8 Do Texas
and the Arizona statutes (and the short-lived statutes of the "new"
community property states) obviate this problem by declaring to be
separate property all that was "acquired or claimed" before marriage?' 0
(e) Control and disposition of community interests. In general, the
husband has the sole power of management, control and disposition of
community property, but this is subject to various qualifications. 20
In Idaho,21 for example: (1) the wife has the sole management,
control and disposition of community non-exempt personal property
derived from her own earnings or from the rents and profits of her
separate property (such rent and profits are community property in
Idaho, however). As to similarly derived community exempt personalty
the wife cannot mortgage without the "joint concurrence" of both spouses.
Community realty acquired in the wife's name with the wife's earnings or
from the rents and profits of her separate property, although subject to

married person should be community property to the extent they replace expense,
loss of personal earnings, and depreciation of community properties, but separate
property to the extent they compensate for personal humiliation and depreciation of
separate property holdings. If the defamation antedated marriage, recovery during
marriage would presumably be separate property. See St. Louis & S.W. Ry. v. Wright,
33 Tex. Civ. App. 80, 75 S.W. 565 (1903); Morrissey v. Kirkelle, 5 CA. 2d 183, 42 P. 2d
361 (1935). See Note, 24 So. CALu. L. Rav. 191 (1951).
18. Da. Fumnu § 65 cities Texas and California cases in accord with the Civil
Law rule that title by adverse possession begun prior to the marriage but perfected
after the marriage gives rise to community property ff the possession was without
color of title, separate property if under color of title. The rule that the property is
separate or community according to the marital status when adverse possession was
begun, is favored in 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 439 (3d ed. 1939) (citing McKAY,
§586 (2d ed.). What if divorce antedated completion of the statutory period?
19. Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 Pac. 441, 36 L.RA. (N.S.) 844 (1911). See
MoYsNmA (2 A.L.P.) § 7.11.
As to property acquired partly with community funds and partly with separate
funds, see id. § 7.12; as to property acquired in whole or in part on credit, see id.
§ 714. For an elaborate discussion of the Louisiana law, see Huie, Separate Ownership
of Separate Property Versus Restitution from Community Property in Louisiana,
30 Tax. L. Rsv. 157 (1951), slightly revised in 26 TuLANE L. Rav. 427 (1952); Huie,
Separate Claims to Reimbursement from Community Property in Louisiana, 27
TumANE L. Ray. 143 (1953).
20. In addition to statutes providing for situations where the husband is insane
or otherwise disabled, several statutes restrict his ability to give away the community
property. Independently of statute, a leading case voided his substantial gift of community property to his paramour. Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916).
21. See JACOB, 21-23.
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her sole management and control, cannot2 2 be conveyed or encumbered
without the signature and acknowledgment of each spouse to the deed,
contract, mortgage or other instrument.
(2) Community realty that is subject to the sole control of the
husband cannot be conveyed or encumbered by him 23 unless both spouses
sign and acknowledge the operative instrument. Community exempt
personalty, similarly under his sole control, cannot be mortgaged (but
can be sold) without the concurrence of his wife. The Idaho statute
similarly restricts the encumbering of exempt separate property by the
owning spouse.
(3) If one spouse is adjudged insane, the other may, with court
24
approval, sell community realty.
25
(f) Amenability of community property to judgment creditors.

(1) ATENUPTIAL DEBTS are, in Spanish community property law,
enforceable only against the separate property of the debtor spouse, the
separate property of the other spouse and the latter's share of the community property both being exempt, and even the debtor's share of
community property being exempt from seizure therefor until the dissolution of the marriage.

28

American community property states agree that separate property
of one spouse is not liable for antenuptial debts of the other.27 About
half of such states exempt all or most of the community property from
being reached, during the existence of the marriage, for antenuptial
separate debts, but allow the debtor's half of the community property to
be reached therefor after dissolution of the marriage. 28 California and
Texas expose substantially all the community property to liability for

22. Except to the other spouse. IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (1948).
23. Ibid.
24. IDAHO CODE § 15-2001 (1949). Upon husband's adjudication as insane, wife
may sell community personalty without court order. Id. § 15-2011.
25. Mechem, Creditor's Rights in Community Property, 11 WAsH. L. REV. 78
(1936), reprinted in SELECTED EssAYs ON FApzmy LAW 550 (Foundation Press, 1950).
26. DE FUm
§ 156.
27. Id. § 157. Mo~mAs- (2 AL.P.) § 7.30 lists Texas as contra but this is error.
See 13 TEx. Civ. STAT. Art. 4613 (Vernon, 1951).
28. But cf. MoxymHux, .oamuN
- PaoPERTY § 7.30 (2 Amazic LAw oF Paomar,

at p. 112).
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antenuptial debts of either spouse.29 Louisiana and Idaho subject community property to the antenuptial debts of the husband, not the wife.80
(2) PosTTmuTAz SEPARATE DEBTS (i.e., debts incurred during the

marriage but for a non-community purpose) are enforceable in Spanish
law in the same way as antenuptial debts. The majority of American
community property states, however, hold community property liable
not only for community debts but also for the separate debts of the
husband, nor is the latter liability limited to one half the community
property. Washington is a leading exponent of the non-liability of the
community for any separate debts, including postnuptial debts of the
husband.3 '
(3) Colnu= TY DEBTS (i.e., debts validly created for community
purposes by either or both spouses) are enforceable in Spanish law first
against all the community property and thereafter against the separate
property of the spouse who contracted them.3 2 The majority American
view permits community creditors to reach both the community assets
and the separate pr6perty of the contracting spouse, but there are various
conflicting views and exceptions. In several states the items of community property of which the wife has the sole management, are immune
during the marriage from seizure for community debts created by the
husband, but are liable for her separate debts. 33
(g) Variation of community property by express agreement8 4 Seven
29. DE FuNIAx § 158. The California statute exempts the husband's earnings and
his separate property, but all other community property is liable for wife's antenuptial
debts. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 167, 170 (1949).
30. Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858); Stafford v. Sumrall, 21 So. 2d 83
(La. App. 1945), criticized in Note, 20 TuLAxE L. REV. 136 (1945). Cf. Note, 21 TULANE
L. REv. 125 (1946). See Holt v. Empey, 32 Idaho 106, 178 Pac. 703 (1919). For a minor
exception to this rule in Idaho, see note 33, post.
31. DE FuNAx, § 162.
32. Id. § 159.
33. See JACOB, 37 that the husband's creditors cannot reach the rents and profits
of the wife's separate property, nor the earnings "due and owing" the wife for her
personal services, but can reach such earnings after she receives them [correctly
citing McMillan v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 48 Idaho 163, 280 Pac. 220 (1929) ],
but that these items of community property are liable for the wife's separate debts.
34. Seven community property states permit prenuptial agreements enlarging or
reducing the types of acquisitions during marriage which shall be community property. In Texas, however, this power of variation by prenuptial agreement is insubstantial. HuIE, CoamN=r PROPETY LAW OF TEXAS § 9; and see Frame v. Frame, 120
Tex. 61, 36 S.W. 2d 152, 155 (1931) (citing earlier case). There is less uniformity as
to the validity, permissible scope, and effect of such agreements when made during
marriage. See Infra n. 35.
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community property states pernit antenuptial agreements to vary the
normal applicability of the community property statutes. Postnuptial
agreements may in most community property states change the status
(as separate or community) of existing separate or community holdings,
but some jurisdictions do not permit such change as to future acquisitions.35

(h) Distinctionbetween community property and other co-tenancies.
Community property, like tenancy by the entirety, exists only between
two persons, and those two must be husband and wife. Tenants in community have equal beneficial interests. Unlike common law tenancy by
the entirety,3 6 community property may exist also in personal property.
Unlike all the common law co-tenancies except that of entireties, community property is normally under the sole management and control of
the husband (and, unlike entireties, some community assets may be
under the sole control of the wife). Unlike all the other co-tenancies,
community property may be reached not merely for community debts,
but (in most jurisdictions) for the separate debts of the spouse having
sole management and control (and, in some instances only, for the separate debts of the other spouse).
Unlike joint tenancy and tenancy by entreties, community property
does not give rise to a jus accrescendi. If one spouse dies, the other is
entitled to his own half of the community holdings, but this is not strictly
a taking by survivorship. The same effect would occur where the parties
were divorced and the community holdings were evenly divided between
them. Moreover, the first dying spouse has a power of testation regarding
his share of community holdings, the surviving spouse taking only as
devisee, or under intestacy, or according to some other specific statutory
37
provision.
35. See Notes: 171 A.L.R. 1336 (1947); 8 So. CALmF. L. Rzv. 327 (1934); 28 TEx. L.
Rzv. 275 (1949); 4 S.W.L.J. 218 (1950). See also Clark, Transmutations in New Mexico
Community Property Law, 24 Rocxy MT. L. HPiv. 273 (1952); Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.
Mex. 393, 244 P. 2d 781, 30 AL.R. 2d 1236 (1952) (community funds may be transmuted into a joint tenancy between the spouses; expressly overruling contrary holding of McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N. Mex. 27, 85 P. 2d 78, 120 A.L.R. 250 (1938); Ogden,
Joint Tenancies, 1952 PROcEEDINGs, American Bar Assn. Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law, 17 21; Report of the Committee on Community Property and
Jointly Held Titles to Real Property, 1952 PRocEzzmrGs, supra 33, 1953 PROCDMINGS 59.
36. See 2 AwMRIcAN LAW OF PROPpTy § 6.6, nn. 28, 29 (1952).

37. Dower and curtesy do not exist in community property states, being less
advantageous to the survivor than is the half of the community. Homestead exemptions, however, do exist. Half of the community property states permit testamentary
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I.
Theorists have attempted to classify the community property system, particularly as it existed in a given state, as involving:
38

1. The community as a separate entity from either spouse.
2. The husband as trustee for, and co-cestui with, the wife.
3. Simply a manner of property holding, each spouse having
an equal present half interest, though one spouse (usually the
husband) may have power to manage or convey.30 This concept
is in many respects the most satisfactory and is currently the
most widely held, viewing the community accumulations as the
joint product of the combined (though possibly dissimilar) talents
and labors of both spouses.
4. The husband as sole owner, with the wife having merely
a spes successionis. This view, now obsolete, existed in Louisiana
40
It
and California prior to the rise of the Federal Income Tax.
prevented the spouses from obtaining the advantage of lower tax
brackets since they could not "split" the community income by
each reporting half of it.4 ' Accordingly, Louisiana and California

disposition of all the deceased's half, either to or away from the surviving spouse.
DE Fumx § 198. Cf. Note, 25 So. CALIF. L. REv. 464 (1952). JAcOB, pp. 24-25 details the
evolution of the Idaho statute hereon. See also IDAHO CODE § 14-113 (1949) and
MoyxH=x (2 A.L.P.) § 7.34.
In United States v. Merrill, 211 F. 2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954), it is pointed out that,
although Washington law subjects the entire community property to administration on
the death of one spouse, an undivided half of such community property nevertheless
remained the'present property of the survivor, hence only half of the income from
the community property while under administration was taxable to the decedent's
estate, the other half being taxable to the survivor, and an executor's fee earned by the
survivor was payable half from the decedent's estate and half from the survivor's,
hence only the former half of the fee constituted income.
38. Mechem, op, cit. note 25 supra, classifies community property theory as either
"entity" or "aggregate". Cf. Evans, Ownership of Community Property, 35 Hav. L.
REv. 47 (1921). Note, 3 ALA. L. Rzv. 238 (1952).
39. Occasionally the marital community is referred to as a "partnership", the
latter term used loosely, rhetorically, or by way of suggesting a common law analogue.
There are many obvious differences, such as the way the relationship is created or
terminated, who and how many persons may be included, the dispreportionately
greater power of one "partner" to dispose of or encumber the firm assets and the
subjection of those assets to the claims third persons have against that individual.
40. See Daggett, Nature of Wife's Interest in Community Property-Comparative
Study, 19 CALiF. L. REV. 567-601 (1931), reprinted in DAGGETT, LEGAL EssAYs ou
FAuIIy LAw 101-148 (1935). Cf. Theriot v. Comm'r. Internal Revenue, 197 F. 2d 13
(5th Cir. 1952). As to the complications flowing from California rulings that statutes
enlarging the wife's interest could not be retro-active, see MoYNnum
(2 AL.?.)
§7.20; Note, 27 TtNE L. Rlv. 116 (1952) (criticizing a Montana construction of the
California law).
41. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315, 70 LEd. 285, 46 Sup. Ct. 148 (126).
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both adopted the view that the wife had an equal present vested
interest in community property. As.a result of the latter view,
which prevailed also in other community states, a married person
with a high income paid less federal income tax if domiciled in
a community property state4 2 than another married person
having the same income but domiciled in a non-community state.
As tax rates increased, a nation-wide clamour arose for abolition of
this obvious tax inequality. Congressional inertia prompted various
curative measures. First, it became apparent that contract agreements
between husband and wife in non-community states that their income
43
should be equally owned, were ineffective for federal tax purposes.
Then the Oklahoma legislature (followed shortly by Oregon) adopted
an elective community property system. After this device was held ineffective for federal tax purposes, 44 it was repealed in both states and
followed by a compulsory system. Compulsory community property
systems were also adopted in Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and
Hawaii' 4 5 and many other states were considering similar legislation.
The Internal Revenue Act of 1948 permitted "income-splitting"
between spouses even in non-community states, 46 thus removing the

42. United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792, 75 L~d. 714, 51 Sup. Ct. 184 (1931)
(California taxpayers); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 75 L~d. 239, 51 Sup. Ct. 58
(1930) (Washington taxpayers); Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118, 75 LXEd. 247, 51 Sup.
Ct. 62 (1930) (Arizona taxpayers); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 75 LEd. 249, 51
Sup. Ct. 62 (1930) (Texas taxpayers); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 75 L.Ed. 287,51 Sup.
Ct. 64 (1930) (Louisiana taxpayers).
43. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 74 L.Ed. 731, 50 Sup. Ct. 241 (1930) (California
couple, contracting in 1901 to own "jointly" all income either earned thereafter,
sought unsuccessfully to split his 1920 and 1921 salaries); Blumenthal v. Comm'r. of
Internal Revenue, 60 F. 2d 715 (2d Cir. 1932) cert. den. 287 U.S. 662, 77 LEd. 571, 53
Sup. Ct. 220 (1932).
44. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944), rehearing
den. 323 U.S. 817 (1944).
45. For a comparative analysis of these statues, see Comment, Creditors' Rights
in the Community Property States, 48 CoL. L. REv. 743 (1948).
46. See Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61
HAav. L. RIv. 1097 (1948).
A strictly different provision in the Revenue Act of 1942 [§ 402 (b) (2) ],
removing a similar inequality in the federal estate tax, was held constitutional in
Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945) (Louisiana decedent) and United States v.
Rompel, 326 U.S. 367 (1945) (Texas decedent). See Jackson, Taxation of Community
Property-The Wiener Case, 18 TuIA= L. Rlv. 525 (1944); Winstead, Aftermath of
the Herbst and Wiener Decisions, 24 TEx. L. Rsv. 439. (1946). Cf. COLLMGS, CommuNr PRoIPEaTY M TAXEs (1945). This provision was repealed by the Act of 1948.
Surrey, supra 61 HAv. L. REv. at 1118-25. For a later article, see Adams, Estate
and Gift Taxation of the Marital Community: Integrationor Disintegration?,28 WASH.
L. REv. 100 (1953).
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pressure for the adoption of the community system. 47 Unfortunately,
however, the elimination of tax inequality did not itself annul the new
community property acts. Pennsylvania had fortunately declared its act
void, 48 so had no problem, but the other states, 49 all of which repealed
their acts, were faced with the constitutional objection of divesting the
wife of the half interest which she had been given in property acquired
during the life of the act. A variety of presumptions, recording requirements, and limitation statutes, was resorted to in an effort to minimize the
confusion and clouding of titles which the short-lived community property acts might otherwise engender.50
Distinguishing between community and separate property is aided
by various presumptions, including a rebuttable presumption that all
property possessed by a spouse at the dissolution of the marriage was
acquired during the marriage (rather than before), and a rebuttable
presumption that all property acquired during the marriage is community. 51 In most community property jurisdictions, an inventory may be
filed which lists the separate property of the wife and serves both as
constructive notice of her rights and as prima facie evidence that the
52
listed property is actually her separate property.
The necessity that lawyers in other states be aware that community
property laws exist is dramatically emphasized by the not-so-funny

47. 1947 AmmAL SuRwY or Am=cAx LAw, 863, n. 81 (New York agitation).
48. Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A. 2d 521 (1947). This
decision was criticized in 1947 ANN. Surv. A-AT.
LAw 865.
49. Miller v. Stolinski, 149 Neb. 679, 32 N.W. 2d 199 (1948) affirmed a dismissal
of a petition seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality of the Nebraska Act, but did
not decide that question. In Oklahoma, since Harmon v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
189 Okla. 475, 118 P. 2d 205 (1941) had upheld the validity of the elective community
property statute, judicial nullification of the compulsory act was hardly possible. The
latter act was upheld in Swanda v. Swanda, 207 Okla. 186, 248 P. 2d 575 (1952), in an
opinion which distinguished and rejected the contrary Pennsylvania ruling. See
Note, 6 OKLA. L. REv. 190 (1952).
50. See 1949 Am. Suav. Am. LAw 747-751 (and authorities cited); Note, 50 COL.
L. REv. 332 (1950). Cf. Davis v. Okla. Tax Comm., 206 Okla. 644, 246 P. 2d 318 (1952);
Note, 6 OELA. L. RPv. 190 (1953).
51. The California statutory presumption that real or personal property acquired
by a married woman by an instrument in writing is her separate property is discussed in In re Walsh's Estate, 66 CA. 2d 704, 152 P. 2d 750 (1944); Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Wellman, 98 CA. 2d 151, 219 P. 2d 506 (1950). Cf. IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (1948)
(as amended by L. 1943, c. 23 § 1): "Real property conveyed by one spouse to
the other shall be presumed to be the sole and separate estate of the grantee and only
the grantor spouse need execute and acknowledge the deed". Cf. MornAx
(2 A.L.P.) § 7.14. On the effect in Texas of filing (or failing to file) a schedule of the
wife's separate property, see Note, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 325 (1953).
52. DE FUNmx § 60 (citing statutes); 5 BAYLOR L. Rv. 325 (1953) (Texas law).
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defeat of the dying wishes of comedian W. C. Fields, whose attempted
separation agreement, entered into in New York City nearly forty years
before his death, failed to prevent his decades-separated wife from
obtaining half of the proceeds of insurance policies purchased by Fields
with money he earned in California many years after their parting. 3

53. Fields v. Fields, 178 F. 2d 200 (9th Cir. 1950), discussed in 1950 ANN. SuRv.
115 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.
Cal. 1953). See also King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W. 2d 803 (1947) cert. den.
332 U.S. 769 (1947), 60 HIAv. L. REv. 1155 (1947), 31 Tax. L. REv. 340 (1948) (Texas
spouses in New York purported to assign to each other a separate half-interest in the
community personalty situate in New York).
Az. LAw, 599-602. Cf. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Quay,
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